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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

CHRISTIAN V. STATE: THE MITIGATION DEFENSES OF
HOT-BLOODED RESPONSE TO ADEQUATE
PROVOCATION AND IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE CAN
APPLY TO MITIGATE FIRST-DEGREE ASSAULT
CHARGES.
By: Jason HeUer
In a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland

held that, under certain circumstances, the mitigation defenses of hotblooded response to legally adequate provocation and imperfect selfdefense may apply to reduce first-degree assault to second-degree
assault. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008). More
specifically, the court stated that these mitigation defenses are
applicable to first-degree assault charges where such assaults would
supply the underlying malice for a felony-murder charge in the event
the victim dies. Christian, 405 Md. at 332-33, 951 A.2d at 847-48.
In the first of two consolidated cases, a dispute arose between
Daniel Christian ("Christian") and Raynard Moulden ("Moulden") in a
mall parking lot. Following a verbal altercation between Christian and
Moulden, a physical struggle ensued, and Christian stabbed Moulden,
allegedly in self-defense.
Before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Christian requested
a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense to mitigate the first-degree
assault charge. The court denied the request, and the jury convicted
Christian of first-degree assault and related charges. Christian
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which held that
the circuit court did not commit reversible error in refusing the
instruction because an imperfect self-defense instruction is only
applicable in homicide cases. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to consider this case.
In the second consolidated case, Kalilah Romika Stevenson
("Stevenson") drove to her estranged husband's home to retrieve her
daughter's book bag. While in the home, Stevenson and her motherin-law began arguing. Her husband, Antonio Corbin ("Corbin"),
intervened in an attempt to break up the dispute and sought to forcibly
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remove Stevenson from his home. Stevenson stabbed Corbin twice in the
foreann with a butcher knife, allegedly in response to Corbin's use of
force.
Stevenson, on trial before the Circuit Court for Wicomico County,
requested a jury instruction on the mitigation defense of hot-blooded
response to adequate provocation, which the court denied. The jury found
Stevenson guilty of fIrst-degree assault and related charges. Stevenson
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed,
holding that the mitigation defense of hot-blooded response to adequate
provocation was inapplicable in Stevenson's case because fIrst-degree
assault was not a shadow offense of murder. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to consider this case.
In front of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Christian and Stevenson
argued that the intent to cause serious physical hann supplies the requisite
malice to consider fIrst-degree assault a shadow form of murder because it
shares the malice associated with other shadow offenses such as attempted
murder, felony-murder, and the inchoate forms of those crimes. Id at 313,
951 A.2d at 836. Further, Christian and Stevenson contended that fIrstdegree assault is an underlying crime for felony-murder, and thus
mitigation defenses should apply. Id at 314, 951 A.2d at 836.
Conversely, the State asserted that mitigation defenses to negate malice
are unavailable because the intent and malice requirements for fIrst-degree
assault are disparate from murder and its shadow forms. Id at 314-15,
951 A.2d at 837. The court rejected the State's argument, effectively
altering Maryland's traditional common law. Id at 332-33, 951 A.2d at
848.
Historically, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that mitigation
defenses of hot-blooded response to adequate provocation and imperfect
self-defense only apply to charges of criminal homicide and its shadow
forms. Id. at 322, 951 A.2d at 841. Before the General Assembly enacted
the current assault statutes in 1996, the court expanded the availability of
the mitigation defenses to charges of assault with the intent to murder. Id
at 325, 951 A.2d at 843. The difference between the mitigation defense
for murder and an assault with intent to murder charge is that murder
would be reduced to manslaughter, whereas an assault with intent to
murder would be reduced to simple assault. Id at 326, 951 A.2d at 844.
To determine the applicability of the mitigation defenses to fIrst-degree
assault, the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined the relationship
between mitigation and malice. Id at 329, 951 A.2d at 846. The court
explained that the requisite malice for a murder charge is different than the
malice required for other crimes. Id (citing Richmond v. State, 330 Md.
223, 231, 623 A.2d 630, 634 (1993)). The malice element of murder
encompasses the requisite state of mind, as well as an absence of
mitigation. Christian, 405 Md. at 329,951 A.2d at 846 (citing Richmond,
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330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634). However, criminal charges other than
murder do not require an absence of mitigating circwnstances to satisfy
the malice element. Christian, 405 Md. at 329, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing
Richmond, 330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634). The court noted that the use
of mitigation defenses is specific only to murder charges and its shadow
forms. Christian, 405 Md. at 329-30, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing Richmond,
330 Md. at 231,623 A.2d at 634).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland further stated that the purpose of the
felony-murder doctrine is to deter dangerous acts by charging any
homicide resulting from the acts as murder, regardless of the offender's
intent to kill. Christian, 405 Md. at 330, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing Roary v.
State, 385 Md. 217, 226-27, 867 A.2d 1095, 1100 (2005)). The court
explained that first-degree assault is within the doctrine's purpose,
therefore sufficiently serving as an underlying crime to felony-murder.
Christian, 405 Md. at 330, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing Roary, 385 Md. at 22627,867 A.2d at 1100).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that a
felony-murder charge is dependent on the malice of the underlying crime
being applied to the resulting homicide. Christian, 405 Md. at 332, 951
A.2d at 847. In light of its prior holdings, the court reasoned that firstdegree assault can possess the requisite malice to charge an offender with
felony-murder if the victim dies. Christian, 405 Md. at 332, 951 A.2d at
847. Therefore, the court found that under certain circumstances, firstdegree assault constitutes a shadow offense of homicide. Id The court
thus held that the mitigation defenses of hot-blooded response to adequate
provocation and imperfect self-defense are applicable to mitigate firstdegree assault charges where the assault would create the requisite malice
for felony-murder. Id at 332-33, 951 A,2d at 847-48. The court noted
that the availability of mitigation defenses still does not extend to crimes
other than murder and its shadow forms; but now, under certain
circwnstances, first-degree assault is a shadow form of murder. Id.
By holding that mitigation defenses can be applicable to reduce firstdegree assault charges, the Court of Appeals of Maryland strives to amend
the incongruity that enables a perpetrator whose victim dies to be
incarcerated for less time than an offender whose victim lives. The court's
decision may encourage offenders, who are unaware that mitigation
defenses are still limited to murder and its shadow forms, to invoke
mitigation defenses for lesser crimes, resulting in delayed proceedings.
However, this potential consequence is incomparable to the benefit of
mending an unjust sentencing incongruity. The decision in Christian will
encourage courts to be more liberal with the availability of mitigation
defenses for assault charges. Further, as this is an issue of first impression
in Maryland, it is plausible to predict that the availability of mitigation
defenses for assault related charges, under certain circumstances, will
evolve to include additional variations of assault.

